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ABSTRACT 
World Society was the leitmotif of John Groom. It was a pluralist vision of International 
Relations set against Realism and state hegemonies. In this, it sought to establish an 
enhanced pluralism, citizen organisation and action, as a norm. It was a prescient forerunner 
of what we now commonly recognise as international civil society. Groom's other resonant 
work on third party and Track II mediation – citizen agency and intervention on behalf of 
norms of shared needs and equality - was an expression of that. However, all this took place 
within the context of an interlinked world system described as a cobweb. Not only did this 
model fail to predict the spiders and slaughter in today’s cobweb, it shared an Enlightenment 
view of civil society as secular. This paper talks about religious spiders and the sort of 
atrocious but anti-hegemonic pluralism that is now vexatiously glued to all we do 
internationally. However, the paper recognises that, reconfigured, Groom’s work laid first 
foundations for today’s International Relations. 
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John Groom is often regarded as a disciple of John Burton. The two men were pluralists who 
were essentially in defiance of Realism and the notion of hegemonic world orders. In a 
romantic sense they were champions of the round table, the Camelot-istas of International 
Relations. This was certainly evident in the diplomatic career of Burton before he became an 
academic. His work as Australian ambassador to the San Francisco conference that 
established the United Nations was noteworthy for ensuring the Security Council did not 
have even more power than it was bequeathed. That the General Assembly emerged with 
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even some rights and powers was due to the distaste of people like Burton for the aggregation 
of hegemonies.1 
Articulating this in academic terms, Burton did not use round table terminology. That would 
have been too regular and in itself artificial. So his ‘World Society’ was premised upon a 
‘cobweb model’ of endless interlinkages.2 Groom championed this terminology in his own 
works.3 And, in his huge succession of edited volumes with Paul Taylor, he certainly 
emerged as a champion of the United Nations and other international organisations.4 It was as 
a champion of the Commonwealth that I first came across him, when I was working for the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.5 
John Groom emerged most fully from Burton’s shadow, however, in his championing of 
Europe. This was in practical and professional as well as academic terms. His efforts to 
establish European consortia and committees of International Relations, very much as an 
antidote to the then US-dominated International Studies Association, reflected his affection 
and affiliation to the continent. This was clear in his Francophilia. He spoke a most elegant 
and discursive French. In fact, he spoke French as if he were speaking an essay. I remember 
once, at a conference in Grenoble, he had laryngitis and asked me to read his paper to the 
audience. I remember thinking as I did so, ‘but this man is an essayist; he thinks and reasons 
as an essayist; like a French essayist. He writes like Montaigne. The logical objections and 
limits are swept aside in an act of literature.’  
If I were to say that he was a great editor and essayist, this is meant as praise. And, for his 
role as a great Europeanist, the University of Tampere in Finland awarded him an honorary 
doctorate.  
But, having said all that, the problem of the cobweb model, for all its highly visible norms to 
do with pluralism and against hegemony, for all its precursor work to what we now call 
global civil society and the organised citizens of the world, is three-fold: 
1. It gets sticky in there. 
2. The cobweb links anything that can be linked, but doesn’t go anywhere. 
                                                          
1 https://activity.scar.gmu.edu/parents-of-field/john-burton downloaded 31 August 2017. 
2 John W. Burton, Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis (Hemel Hempstead: Wheatsheaf 
Harvester, 1987). 
3 William C. Olsen & A.J.R. Groom, International Relations Then and Now (London: Harper Collins, 1991). 
4 Especially Paul Taylor & A.J.R. Groom (eds.), International Organisation: A Conceptual Approach (London: 
Pinter, 1978). 
5 A.J.R. Groom & Paul Taylor (eds.), The Commonwealth in the 1980s (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984). 
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3. Any self-respecting cobweb will have spiders and, as a result, corpses. 
There is another problem and that is the cobweb’s metaphysical self – or, more accurately, 
points of metaphysical imagery. If, at a certain sticky juncture, there is the Taleban as an 
actor in world society (and, through its links with Al Qaeda, it certainly became so), there is 
the key question of ‘what is the Taleban?’ Is the organisation as the US and NATO portrayed 
it? Is it how it saw itself? Is it the somewhat romanticised if evil creature that emerges from 
books like The Kite Runner, which was written as if trying too hard to be a Master of Fine 
Arts project in creative writing6 – and the film version which was as exotic and orientalised 
as any other Hollywood recreation of any other part of the world?7 How does the cobweb 
stand up to Edward Said’s critique of orientalism? It’s all very well to be pluralistic, but 
pluralism can misunderstand the ‘Other’ just as perniciously (or naively) as Realism.8  Let us, 
however, first look at the deeper intellectual composition of World Society and its cobweb 
model. 
 
World Society and the Cobweb 
The model was a real effort at an antidote to Realism and, in the Cold War context, should 
also be considered courageous. It was different from the wider ‘paradigm’ of Pluralism in its 
quite specific origins. The first real articulation of World Society came in 1974.9 It appeared 
in a paper authored by Burton and Groom, and others in a collective later known as the 
Centre for the Analysis of Conflict – because of its unlovely rendition as an acronym, 
renamed in the 1980s as the Centre for Conflict Analysis. This centre in itself revealed the 
nature of World Society, as the ethos of the centre was to do with conflict resolution based on 
third party mediation and facilitation – with the clear idea that Track Two actors could 
participate in diplomacy and make equal contributions to those of the great powers. Into 
Pluralism was injected, via World Society, an idea of equality. There were two other 
attributes of World Society: 
The first was its clear commitment to the possibility of peace. In this, a clear influence was 
the work of Johan Galtung.10 It observed Galtung’s distinctions between negative peace (the 
                                                          
6 Khaled Hosseini, The Kite Runner (New York: Riverhead Penguin, 2003). 
7 Directed by Marc Foster, 2007. Foster made the James Bond film, Quantum of Solace, a year later in 2008, 
using the same cinematic flourishes and signatures. 
8 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1981). 
9 John Burton, A.J.R. Groom, C.R. Mitchell, A.V.S. de Reuk, The Study of World Society: A London Perspective, 
International Studies Association Occasional Paper 1 (University Center for International Studies, University of 
Pittsburg, 1974). 
10 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, 6:3, 1969. 
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avoidance of war) and positive peace (peace without fear in the literal and unencumbered, 
unconditional sense of peace) and sought citizen action as a force towards positive peace. In 
this sense it was very much more idealistic than most variants of Pluralism. 
The second was the implicit recognition that citizen action, however equal to state action it 
might aspire to be, could not accomplish full systemic and structural change in the world. The 
core assumption in World Society was the functionalism of David Mitrany.11 But this 
assumed a world in which development was such that technical and technological 
cooperation in what were assumed to be sectors developed enough for cooperation could take 
place. It did not fully recognise, in the era before the woes of post-colonialism became clear, 
that functionalism was not easily possible among uneven partners in which one was so 
uneven that it was the recipient of foreign aid rather than a participant in technical 
cooperation. It did not recognise that poverty, memory of past injustice, religious antipathy, 
and cultural factors would demand rightly or wrongly violent justice – and not peace, and not 
cooperation, and not even equality, but subjugation of its ‘Other’ with a clear sub-text of 
vengeance. 
Dennis Sandole perceived that there was a further World Society sub-text, and that was the 
influence of Ted Robert Gurr and his thesis of relative deprivation.12 In that sense, with 
relative deprivation’s fit with material functionalism, the factor of confessional violence – 
which cannot be fully ‘fixed’ by making deprivation less relative – was again marginalised in 
the key assumptions of World Society. Hence, when it came to later times – those after the 
Cold War between a developed West and a developed East with a developed Europe in 
between the megaliths of the United States and the Soviet Union, the theory of World Society 
in its original idealistic mode could not fit. In particular, the key assumption that the cobweb  
was a positive antidote to Realism found it hard work to accommodate a dark web in which 
new Realisms were being hatched and new antagonists to peace, and new variants of conflict, 
were being propagated.  
 
The Taleban 
Let us start with the Taleban. It arose as a militant protest against rapacious warlordism in 
Afghanistan in 1994, and won national power in 1996. It was in 1994 that Groom published 
with Margot Light their edited volume, Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to 
Theory, in which I contributed the concluding chapter, ‘Beyond the north-west: Africa and 
the east’.13 I tried to say there was much out there beyond our bounds of rationality and moral 
                                                          
11 Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), p 134. 
12 Dennis J.D. Sandole, ‘John Burton’s Contribution to Conflict Resolution Theory and practice: A Personal 
View’, The International Journal of Peace Research, 6:1, 2001. 
13 London: Pinter. 
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compass – but did not mention Afghanistan. Up to that time, the only established IR theorist 
to have written anything about Afghanistan was Fred Halliday14 – and it took until 2000 and 
the work of Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Rashid, before the Western world had anything like a 
fullish portrait of what was by then a rebel group in full international glare.15 But I start with 
the Taleban since, notwithstanding the somewhat different rise and trajectory of Al Qaeda, 
and more recently ISIS, the Taleban is still there. It may be a somewhat different Taleban to 
the original model, but US foreign policy thinks it just the same. On 22 August 2017, 
President Donald Trump – against his campaign pledges – announced a new policy for 
increasing the military battle, and the US role in it, against the Taleban.16 But has anyone 
come to any greater understanding of the Taleban? And what it means for the cobweb of 
spider’s silk – and fire and death? 
I wish to draw here a second parallel – having already suggested the cobweb acted as 
precursor to global civil society – and that is the parallel between the cobweb and globalism. 
If the spider controls the cobweb, the competition is on to control globalism, and insurgent 
groups are in the forefront of that competition. Three initial declaratory points emerge: 
 
1. Globalisation is no longer a phenomenon shaped only by Western interests and 
Western corporations – the corporations constituting an international pluralism in 
their own right 
2. Other interests, including those we label as insurgent, are getting curiously as good if 
not better at globalisation than we are. 
3. The struggle should be over who controls the pace of globalisation, not who controls 
globalisation per se. The faster it happens the more likely there will be new points of 
engagement that tear us all away from sentimental attachments to established or 
settled ways. Insurgency, above all, pushes the pace – whenever it can, relentlessly. 
The problem of insurgency is misperceived and misconceived, then misrepresented, if seen 
only in local or even regional terms. It is misperceived if seen in any sort of static terms or 
even fixed historical terms. History itself changes. A global world means what it says – and 
that is for good and for bad. Some preliminaries before returning to the Taleban:  
When the Tienanmen Square killings occurred in 1989, and I was then young in my tenure as 
an academic in John Groom’s department at the University of Kent, the world at large learnt 
                                                          
14 Fred Halliday, ‘Introduction’ in Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan (London: Verso, 1988). 
15 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000). 
16 Julie Hirschfield & Mark Lander, ‘Trump Outlines New Afghanistan War Strategy’, The New York Times, 21 
August 2017. 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Global Society Vol. 32 No. 2, 
149-161. Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2018.1433131 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26290/  
about them from news broadcasts – some broadcast images, like the lone protester carrying 
only a shopping bag barring the way of a column of tanks, have become iconic. Images 
become politicised and then they become archived as art. But the protesters themselves began 
churning out fax reports to friends and contacts all over the world. The immediacy of grainy 
photographs, smeared with ink from low-grade home telephone/fax receivers, added to the 
plangent tragedies that were occurring at the other end of one’s own telephone line. One sent 
out one faxed picture at a time and the more often it was re-faxed, the grainier it became. A 
mere 20 years later, in 2009, when Tehran was full of protests against a rigged election and 
the television cameras were banned, the world – including the television broadcasters – saw 
the clear visual evidence of violent suppression from high-grade cell-phone cameras. 
Immediacy had become crystalline, and nothing could be hidden any more. One person, 
effectively, can set into chain a global awareness that cascades, not from one fax transmitter 
to another single receiver, but from website to site, email to huge address lists. In less than an 
hour, one cell-phone video can be seen by several millions. And the captions for such images 
came via Twitter – short, condensed, urgent, and personalised. Globalisation of this sort, in 
real time, was also intimate.  
This kind of personalised but globalised linkage has been the hallmark of post 9/11 
‘terrorism’ and, indeed, allowed 9/11 to be planned. The assault on the Twin Towers was a 
triumph not just for ‘extremism’ but for technology. There is nothing medieval or isolated 
about the means of organisation and delivery. That we should assume medievalism in 
animating ideology takes an effort in elision. Here I discuss briefly the global and 
technological means of ‘terror’, or what others would call ‘resistance’.  
Part of this has long utilised the international monetary transfer systems, whether of banks or 
agencies like Western Union, or old-fashioned couriers. The collapse of the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce almost 30 years ago – one of the first high street banks in the West with a 
Middle Eastern origin – was partly because of the discovery of massive undercover 
laundering and transfer deals. These days, there is hardly a bank, Western or Eastern, that has 
not handled such deals. All that has happened is a greater sophistication in how non-banking 
operatives – high level lawyers and accountants, many in the City of London – establish 
complex cascading systems of companies that launder monies, initially laterally (from 
company to similar company for apparent services rendered) before vertically (to a finance or 
investment house for reinvestment or venture capital). Then it comes back down another 
chain. Corrupt senior politicians will utilise such methods for their billions; and Somali 
pirates will use a condensed version for their millions.  
Those pirates at their height also had, in the City of London, ‘agents’ who were able to access 
the navigation logs and locations of ships sailing around the Horn of Africa. When seizure 
was made, the negotiations for ransom were conducted via agents and other third parties. 
Ransom was either electronically transferred and immediately laundered in a complex series 
of transactions, or delivered by forms of executive mercenary directly to the seized ship. The 
money then entered the laundering chain before being reinvested in equipment and, often, 
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development projects in the neighbourhoods of the pirates. It was illegal but ingenious, in 
some ways restorative of a degenerated environment, suitably vengeful in terms of pillaged 
livelihood based on fisheries, and highly technologised. It depended on the world financial 
system of transfers as much as any legitimate flow. It began as unsanitary and became 
sanitised. 
When John Groom was at the height of his powers, Afghanistan was beginning its impact on 
the world. Associated with the Al Qaeda attack of 9/11 on the Twin Towers, if only as the 
host of Al Qaeda, the Taleban became a byword for notoriety. It arose in 1994, and the huge 
conference of the special group of the European Consortium of Political research was 
convened by Groom in Paris in 1995. It was the ‘break out’ conference for European 
International Relations. My co-edited book on the seven sessions I convened in Paris with 
Osmo Apunen on ‘Other’ IR came out in 2001, the year of the Twin Towers.17 In more ways 
than one, the mountain warriors of Afghanistan haunt this paper. 
The image of the mountain guerrilla in Afghanistan or the borderlands of Pakistan – 
technologised only by his AK47 – is dated and, in fact, was always inaccurate. Heavy duty 
global communication facilitated the 9/11 attack. It was not dependent on a bearded fanatic in 
a facility-free cave. Cell phones are only one aspect of the planning and coordination arsenal. 
Careful surveillance and rehearsal are others, and – insofar as Afghan personnel are linked to 
internationalised struggles - are fed into computer simulations before attacks are launched. 
Certainly, although unrelated to the Afghan struggle, the 2008 attack on Mumbai seems to 
have been planned in this way – with detailed knowledge of the internal configuration of the 
main hotel target and deployment in anticipation of how security forces would respond. For 
every technique of counter-insurgency, from ‘hearts and minds’ to engagement-free drones, 
there are insurgency techniques of education and indoctrination, and terror bombing 
delivered, like drones, to the heart of target areas.  
What would an Afghan model look like? It might be instructive for planners to model a 
guerrilla organigram on the functionality of a grouping that is on ‘our’ side, assuming for the 
time being that one might mirror another. Let us take a purely imaginary provincial governor, 
let us imagine of Kandahar; he has a purely imagined brother who is the Afghan president; he 
has a provincial militia which acts against the Taleban and does so with reasonable 
effectiveness, even with non-Geneva-compliant brutalities; in return, he receives financial 
feeds from the CIA, who also turn a blind eye to his thriving intercontinental export business 
of colourful poppy products. None of these feeds and export revenues leaves a lengthy 
forensic trail, certainly not one that has been unlaundered along the lines described above, but 
the export business does require international partnerships – meaning relationships and 
financial shares with organisations in trans-shipment zones. So, let us imagine that the poppy 
products reach Western Europe via Pakistan, Equatorial Guinea, and Croatia. In at least one 
                                                          
17 Stephen Chan, Peter Mandaville & Roland Bleiker (eds.), The Zen of International Relations (Houndmills; 
Palgrave, 2001). 
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of those locations, refinements and processing of the exports will occur. They are subject to 
‘beneficiation’ to render the export into a ‘retail commodity’. So that the chain of interactions 
and complex exchanges is significant and sophisticated and parallels those of a formal and 
legal enterprise and, indeed, surfaces regularly to participate in legalised aspects of the 
transaction and financial chain. In turn, our imagined governor will import benefits for 
himself and equipment for his militia – the latter via a complex chain of purchases from arms 
dealers who themselves live in a world best described as shady. In this sense, no Taleban 
commander invents a model for his own use and benefit. He borrows one, which has 
emulated ones in long use in other parts of the world and in which, for instance, Western 
organisations like the CIA have long been instrumental. If intelligence agencies transact 
above and underground worlds, why be surprised when others do?   
And, of course, the Taleban foot-soldiers demand benefits too. These are catered for. The 
footwear of choice are American basketball trainers, Jordans and Converse hi-tops – and their 
commanders have been known to wear Gucci boots under their traditional costumes. If 
international fashion is part of an insurgency, there is no reason to suppose anything is wholly 
localised.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Italian mediation of the Mozambican conflict saw the 
Rome government and the Vatican persuade the RENAMO guerrilla negotiators to remain 
talking by buying them all Armani suits and taking them to Serie A football matches. Escorts 
of a preferred Berlusconian age would also have featured. Apparently, the football matches 
were the clincher.18 Successful counter-insurgency in Afghanistan should include the 
saturation of the southern provinces with Manchester United souvenirs and replica shirts. The 
trick might not be to seek local modes of addressing ‘local’ dissatisfactions, but to further 
internationalise taste and interest. Provision of the best wireless broadband service in 
Transcaucasia, the militant distribution of i-phones, and the provision of 500 pornographic 
websites in Pashtun language, might weaken resolve faster and better than 500 drones. This is 
not ‘soft power’ as much as simple subversion. 
I exaggerate to make a point. If our physical presence in Afghanistan is the problem, then no 
alteration of the modalities associated with our physical presence will make any difference. If 
we are not physically present, but electronically so, then it will be we who have emulated 
guerrilla techniques of international persuasion and recruitment. Times have moved on. The 
guerrillas resemble little those of Chairman Mao. That we should fight them as if they were is 
a failure of imagination.    
My key point is that all ‘local’ conflicts which draw an international reaction did so in the 
first place because they had international repercussions based on international outreach. 
Otherwise we would not be there. We then fight the outreach both at source, on ‘location’, 
and in our own locations, raiding mosques in London to ferret out ‘bad preachers’. But it is 
                                                          
18 See Stephen Chan & Moises Venancio, War and Peace in Mozambique (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1998). 
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the link between locations that is the key: the modes of internationalisation are the same 
modes to combat it. Discreet theatres of operation lead to nothing except discreet results (or 
failures). And all this begs key questions about our historical background responsibility for 
our own problems. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia did more harm than good.19 Arming, 
via Pakistan, the Mujahadeen to fight the Soviets led to rapacious Mujahadeen government 
that led to the uprising of the Taleban.20 The list is long and well-rehearsed and, in many 
salient respects, well-argued. But, if history cannot be restaged, taking events into new 
historical epochs might be the better option. Counter-insurgency thus needs to make a 
generation-jump – just as insurgency already has.  
Let me briefly return to Tehran. There are many universities in that city, and they provided 
many of the demonstrators after the false elections of 2009. But, if one were to study 
International Relations at them, then one would study in the same way as in the West.21 The 
same authorities, the same key texts, the same philosophical animateurs of Kant and Hegel, 
the same faddish but fascinated involvements with Foucault, and the same US rendition of 
the subject into broad schools of ‘neo-realism’ and ‘neo-liberalism’. John Groom’s work on 
international organisation is certainly there. The learned objections to Samuel Huntington’s 
division of the world into clashing civilisations, as they emanated from Tehran, relied on a 
footnote apparatus that was far more extensively Western than any ‘Eastern’ compilation of 
sources Huntington used.22 In short, Tehran always knew us far more than we knew Tehran. 
This certainly applied to the 2009 demonstrators. How surprised we were when those 
demonstrators burst onto our screens. In Washington, the suddenly guilty thought was, ‘why, 
we were about to bomb them, and now we learn they are people just like us.’ The demand on 
the streets seemed to suggest that they wanted the right to become more like us. This is true 
but limited. President Ahmedinejad, who ‘won’ the 2009 elections, had a demand in some 
respects exactly the same. If balance of power and deterrence worked for you for decades, 
why should we not apply your own doctrine in our own region? North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, 
under all the culturally-based rhetoric, might in 2017 be making exactly the same point. 
The disquisition above suggests an era and practice of global communication and financial 
transfers. These, in themselves, cannot arm an insurrection. They can help direct it. But the 
                                                          
19 Paolo Tripodi, The Colonial legacy in Somalia – Rome and Mogadishu: from Colonial Administration to 
Operation Restore Hope (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). 
20  https://www.warhistoryonline.com/featured/jihad-with-us-arms-the-soviet-afghan-war.html downloaded 
31 August 2017. 
21  As recounted to me by Professor Mahmoud Sarioghalam, Professor of Political Science, Shaheed Behesti 
(Melli) University, Tehran, in 1994.  More recently, see also: 
http://ut.ac.ir/Files/Files/UNIVERSITY_OF_TEHRAN_PROSPECTUS_2011-2012.pdf , pp 116-122. 
22 Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, ‘The Contest of Civilizations and Interreligious Dialogue’ The Iranian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.XI No. 3 (1999). 
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supply of hardware and munitions still requires physical operations. Here, isolation and 
quarantine – old fashioned techniques – are as useful as ever. However, certain borders are 
porous, and the inputs from Pakistan to the conflict in Afghanistan meant that the revised 
Trump doctrine on Afghanistan gave heavy warnings to Pakistan – notwithstanding the fact 
that the US and Saudi Arabia used Pakistan for exactly such arms transfers when they were 
supporting the Mujahadeen against the Soviets. With access to equipment supplies comes 
training, as in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon, where the fighters resisted the 2006 Israeli 
invasion with Iranian doctrine.23 So that what is fomented and organised transnationally, 
certainly financed via international transactions, has all the same a physical manifestation, 
both in weaponry and the effects of weaponry used according to certain battle doctrines. The 
problem lies in mistaking the physicality for the entire problem – in mistaking ‘kill numbers’ 
for reducing the insurrection. The key omission in John Groom’s work was not just in the 
potential wickedness of the cobweb, its abnormative character, but the assumption that the 
cobweb was secular – whereas the disputes of the West with Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Hezbollah must confront at least religious factors and characteristics. In fact, this has been an 
omission of almost all contemporary discourse on civil society, ever since Hegel proposed the 
place of civil society. Mervyn Frost was for some years John Groom’s colleague at the 
University of Kent, and his philosophical stance on global communitarianism was in some 
ways the Hegelian-based philosophical counterpart to the Groomian cobweb.24 But in his 
influential works on global civil society and how it functioned on ‘settled norms’ Frost 
mentioned not at all religious norms. For Groom, as an historian by original training and as a 
Europeanist, as a scholar on international organisation, the absence of the Vatican in his 
formulations of how organisations worked in world society was startling. It didn’t have to be 
Islamic – although in the present moment it is impossible to avoid questions of Islam. But 
even Groom’s work with Paul Taylor on the first Gulf War was a secular analysis with very 
little religious in its apparatus or outlook.25  
Religion and the web 
I wish to be illustrative in what follows; I do not propose here to enter a long disquisition 
about religion of the sort I have attempted elsewhere.26 I view the secularity of the world 
                                                          
23 For a detailed synopsis of Hezbollah’s strategic preparedness, see Andrew Chadwick, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-2006-lebanon-war-a-short-history , 11 September 2012. For Iran’s 
influence, see http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/world/middleeast/07hezbollah.html?mcubz=1 , 
downloaded 31 August 2017. 
24 Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
25 Paul Taylor & A.J.R. Groom, The United Nations and the Gulf War, 1990-1991: Back to the Future? (London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992). 
26 Stephen Chan, Plural International Relations in a Divided World (Cambridge: Polity, 2017). 
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system – and world society – as a misapprehension. It is a misapprehension that has been 
with us since the Enlightenment and is precisely the provision of the Enlightenment that 
permits us to misunderstand today’s world. Even today, highly distinguished scholars of 
Islam such as Olivier Roy ponder whether religion in fact plays the critical role claimed for it 
in terrorist attacks on European cities. It is, according to Roy, a cover merely for unrest and 
rebellion, for revolt and a romanticised sense of revolution – of the sort with which 
dissatisfied youth have inflected all of modern history.27  
I am taking my argument with Roy forward at length28 – but even he would not claim that 
Afghanistan and other quarrels in the Middle East were adolescent angst that adopted the 
nearest comprehensive ideology available. Here it might be instructive to look briefly at Al 
Qaeda – often conflated in a single breath with the Taleban, but which has always had an 
international agenda; Osama Bin Laden was active in South Sudan and elsewhere, long 
before he ‘settled’ in Afghanistan and, from there, almost used the Taleban as a kind of 
‘cover’ – certainly as a protective host – as he planned and launched 9/11. The Al Qaeda he 
helped found and develop, and spur on with early successes, had not only a religious 
foundation, religious values, a religious ideology, but also a religious mission which sought 
to challenge existing world politics, the world system of states, and world society. It not only 
adopted the colours of being liberationist, but saw itself as holistically transformative – in a 
word, revolutionary.29 
It might be instructive to recall some timelines. In March 2005, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, a London-
based pan-Arab newspaper, published extracts from Saif al-Adel's document ‘Al Qaeda's 
Strategy to the Year 2020.’30 Saif al-Adel had been an Egyptian colonel, involved in the 
assassination of President Sadat, and also an early emigre to Afghanistan to fight alongside 
the Mujahideen  
1. Provoke the United States and the West into invading a Muslim country by staging a 
massive attack or string of attacks on US soil that results in massive civilian 
casualties. 
2. Incite local resistance to occupying forces. 
3. Expand the conflict to neighbouring countries, and engage the US and its allies in a 
long war of attrition. 
                                                          
27 Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State (London: Hurst, 2017). 
28 Stephen Chan, Spearhead to the West: Global Islamic Rebellion, its Idealisation, Textual Command and Drive 
to Violence (London: Hurst, forthcoming 2019). 
29 Osama Bin Laden (ed. Bruce Lawrence), Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden 
(London: Verso, 2005). 
30 11 March 2005. 
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4. Convert Al-Qaeda into an ideology and set of operating principles that can be loosely 
franchised in other countries without requiring direct command and control, and via 
these franchises incite attacks against the US and countries allied with the US until 
they withdraw from the conflict, as happened with the 2004 Madrid train bombings, 
but which did not have the same effect with the 7 July 2005 London bombings. 
5. The US economy will finally collapse by the year 2020, under the strain of multiple 
engagements in numerous places, making the worldwide economic system, which is 
dependent on the US, also collapse, leading to global political instability, which in 
turn will lead to a global jihad led by al-Qaeda, and a Wahhabi Caliphate will then be 
installed across the world, following the collapse of the US and the rest of the 
Western world countries.  
According to Fouad Hussein, a Jordanian journalist and author who spent time in prison with 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the deceased Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Al Qaeda's strategy plan 
consists in seven phases.  
1. The Awakening. This phase was supposed to last from 2001 to 2003. The goal of the 
phase is to provoke the United States to attack a Muslim country by executing an 
attack on US soil that kills many civilians. 
2. Opening Eyes. This phase was supposed to last from 2003 to 2006. The goal of this 
phase was to recruit young men to the cause and to transform the Al Qaeda group 
into a movement. Iraq was supposed to become the centre of all operations with 
financial and military support for bases in other states. 
3. Arising and Standing up. This was supposed to last from 2007 to 2010. In this 
phase, al-Qaeda wanted to execute additional attacks and focus their attention on 
Syria. Hussein believed that other countries in the Arabian Peninsula were also in 
danger. 
4. In the fourth phase, Al Qaeda expected a steady growth of its ranks and territories 
due to the declining power of the regimes in the Arabian Peninsula. The main focus 
of attack in this phase was supposed to be oil suppliers; cyber-terrorism would target 
the US economy and military infrastructure. 
5. The fifth phase would be the declaration of an Islamic Caliphate, which was 
projected between 2013 and 2016. In this phase, Al Qaeda expected the capacity of 
resistance from Israel to be heavily reduced. 
6. The sixth phase was described as the declaration of an ‘Islamic Army’ and a ‘fight 
between believers and non-believers’, also called ‘total confrontation’. 
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7. Definitive Victory, the seventh and last phase was projected to be completed by 
2020. The world will be ‘beaten down’ by the Islamic Army. According to the 7 
phase strategy, this final war is not projected to last longer than 2 years.31 
 
These two different leaders both coincided on similar timelines ending in 2020, and their 
prognosis is shared to the extent that insurgents seem to fight with these stages in mind. The 
major problem is a misreading of the world economy, whereby international capital now has 
more than just a Western pole of power, and interacts with the Chinese economic outreach in 
a way which is both competitive, and mutually supportive. Each pole of power now needs 
and supports the other, so there will be no collapse of the US economy any time soon. But the 
ambition is clear, and that is a supplantation. What will be supplanted is a global economic 
system, the prevailing state structure, and all of world society. 
Insofar as it is against the current Westphalian state system, its notion of a Caliphate is 
primitive in terms of how it would be global. Perhaps it would be a world-wide Caliphate of a 
curiously federal nature, i.e. a federation bound by norms and twin governments – like the 
Vatican in medieval times and its relationship with local states. Within this, the Vatican’s 
world and writ was Catholic, and all society bent to it.  
The advent of ISIS, originally a splinter group from Al Qaeda – and one with, again 
originally, much more of a local agenda than a global one, i.e. how best to fight the Syrian 
and Iraqi wars –finally differed fundamentally from Al Qaeda by forefronting the Caliphate. 
Now it was to be the beginning of global war, conquest and victory – not the end result of 
patient if violent undermining of the world system. But even this was not appreciated as the 
key leitmotif of ISIS when, very belatedly, analysts sought to study it.32 
In the contests of today, this is the march of the spiders and the cobweb they drag forwards. 
ISIS is now studied more intently33 but, as its ‘state’ dominions crumble, its outreach and 
capacity for violence increases. 
 
The faultlines of the web 
                                                          
31      http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-future-of-terrorism-what-al-qaida-really-wants-a-369448.html 
downloaded 31 August 2017. 
32 The very first effort at an investigative article was as late as March 2015: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ - even though it had 
swept aside all Iraqi armies opposing it by early 2014. 
33 e.g. Fawas A. Grerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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There are very few ‘local’ insurrections or insurgencies now. Even something once thought 
atrocious but confined to northern Uganda, the campaign of Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance 
Army, very early went regional. Khartoum was happy to allow it southern Sudanese 
operational bases in return for its side-actions in making life difficult for the secessionist 
SPLA. When the SPLA and Khartoum signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Kony 
was no longer necessary and, when indicted by the International Criminal Court, became a 
possible pawn. Thus, in 2009, in an alarmingly misdirected operation, but one involving a 
somewhat cynical alliance, US special forces commanding northern Sudanese troops 
attempted to surround and kill Kony. It was a disastrous failure and 2000 innocent people 
died. Even Khartoum and Kampala warned against the operation’s prospects. But there was 
the unpublicised spectacle of one indictee of the ICC, Sudan’s President Al Bashir, lending 
his soldiers to kill a fellow indictee, Uganda’s Joseph Kony.34 A local problem which was 
always regional went international for no other strategic reason than, perhaps, one of good 
public relations related to the exploitation of moral cause. But the slippage into global can be 
very rapid and certainly Kony became the bete noir in Western outrage. 
But things, even with Kony, are always more complex than they appear – especially as they 
appear in their reductionist ‘outraged’ portrayal. 35 In the Islamic world, the critique of the 
West that has been formulated within an alarmingly consensual Islamic opinion would not 
have developed without a unifying confessional matrix; but, within this matrix, are issues of 
development and economic share. The Ayatollah Khomeini, in his Parisian exile, was heavily 
influenced by Palestinian neo-Marxist dependency theorists and Fanonian sentiments.36 This 
was similar to the influences on the intellectual forbear of the Iranian revolution, Ali 
Shariati.37 Both men, in somewhat different ways, saw the revival (in Shariati’s case, the 
recreation along Church of England lines) of Islam as key to resisting the rigours of an 
imposed neo-liberalism – but also, above all, of the value and virtue of Islam in itself. They 
also sought – and this no longer seems merely naïve – a fairer international relations. 
                                                          
34  Information supplied to author by Ugandan military officers, never officially substantiated; but 
see subsequent efforts:     
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:d7bI4ONUQSEJ:foreignpolicy.com/2017/0
6/28/800-million-later-joseph-kony-is-still-a-threat/+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk , 28 June 2017; 
downloaded 31 August 2017.     
 
 
35 See an anti-reductionist but necessarily fictionalised account: Stephen Chan, Joseph Kony and the Titans of 
Zagreb (London: Nth Position, 2012). 
36 Nikki R. Keddie, ‘Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective’ in Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury & Mary 
C. Wilson (eds.), The Modern Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) p 617. 
37 Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shari’ati (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000). 
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But perhaps that moment when the fairer world might be negotiated has passed and World 
Society as a normative practice established upon secular values is no longer truly possible. 
Not that there is no cobweb, but one with spiders, and they move in and out of the web, 
between it and the dark web – the dark web meaning precisely the global means of internet 
penetration and disguise that allows dissemination, radicalisation, recruitment and 
deployment.38 
What then of John Groom’s world society? It’s there. He was right. But it is not only secular, 
it is not always positive and not even benign. It is a site ironically of a competition towards 
great hegemonies, and a site of ideas and corrupt money circulation – and the plotting of 
deaths. Insofar as it challenges Realism as embodied by hegemonic states, e.g. the USA, it 
creates a pluralist world of savage competition in which these very states are challenged – not 
as a General Assembly might seek to challenge a Security Council, but as non-state actors 
seek to usurp the great states. 
In short, the malign cobweb restores a sense of challenge in a world where hegemony resided 
in states being more powerful than other states, and where international law prevented legal 
personality for non-state combatants in their earlier challenges. Today’s cobweb overturns 
that. It is the more truly pluralistic version where spiders seek out the enmeshed giant locusts. 
The spiders are not nice but, as Burton and Groom knew, the locusts were never benign.  
The ironic thing is that, thus reconfigured, by the recognition of malignity in the cobweb, the 
model actually works. The web contains new efforts at Realisms, new Realisms to contest old 
Realisms, and it is normative/abnormative, confessional, aspirational, and often non-state (or 
challenging at least the state as a Westphalian creature); it is violent and atrocious. But it is 
pluralistic. It is against Realism as a hegemonic project by one or two or a balanced concert 
of states. It is an arena where Track Two, if properly educated in cultural and religious needs 
– not ‘basic’ needs but complex intellectually-expressed needs – can intrude and 
courageously do good. If this is the case, the worst one can accuse John Groom of is a certain 
post-war naivety which, alongside everybody else’s naivety, did not and could not predict 
today’s world. Add into the mix today’s sorry but unavoidable worldliness – perhaps 
weariness – and the cobweb is something that has reinvented itself as a useful and necessary 
tool for International Relations, something far more illuminating than a Pentagon General’s 
hopeless but unending effort to map a Cold War competition onto something far more 
complex, far more sticky, far more prone to entanglement, far more like a cobweb. 
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